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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici curiae include a nonpartisan public policy 
research foundation dedicated to advancing the 
principles of individual liberty, free markets, and 
limited government and seven law professors who 
teach and write about administrative law, 
constitutional law, and related subjects. 
This case is important to the amici because they 
believe the Fifth Circuit’s extension of Chevron 
deference to an independent federal agency’s 
interpretation of its own jurisdiction-controlling 
statutory provisions is inconsistent with decades of 
this Court’s administrative law precedents, the 
constitutional principles governing the construction 
of statutory delegations of power to federal agencies, 
and the system of checks and balances established by 
the Constitution.  
The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a 
nonpartisan public policy research foundation 
dedicated to advancing the principles of individual 
liberty, free markets, and limited government. Cato’s 
Center for Constitutional Studies was established in 
1989 to help restore the principles of limited 
constitutional government that are the foundation of 
liberty. Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and 
                                            
1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.3(a), letters of consent from 
all parties to the filing of this brief have been submitted to the 
Clerk. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, amici state that this 
brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any 
party, and that no person or entity other than amici or their 
counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this brief. 
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studies, conducts conferences and forums, and 
publishes the annual Cato Supreme Court Review.  
Jonathan H. Adler is the Johan Verheij 
Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the 
Center for Business Law and Regulation at the Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law in 
Cleveland, Ohio, where he teaches and writes on 
administrative, constitutional, and environmental 
law. 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr. is the William T. Comfort, 
III Professor of Law at the New York University 
School of Law. He teaches and writes on 
administrative law, constitutional law, and conflicts 
of laws. 
James Huffman is Dean Emeritus at the Lewis & 
Clark Law School, where he teaches and writes on 
constitutional law, environmental law, and 
jurisprudence.  He is a member of the Hoover 
Institution Property Rights, Freedom and Prosperity 
Task Force. 
Daniel A. Lyons is an assistant professor at 
Boston College Law School, where he teaches and 
writes on property, telecommunications and 
administrative law. 
Andrew P. Morriss is the D. Paul Jones, Jr. & 
Charlene A. Jones Chairholder of Law at the 
University of Alabama School of Law in Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama, where he teaches and writes on regulatory 
issues involving environmental, energy, and offshore 
financial centers. He is affiliated with the Property & 
Environment Research Center, the Regulatory 
Studies Center at George Washington University, 
the Institute for Energy Research, and the Mercatus 
Center at George Mason University. He is a 
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Research Fellow at the New York University Center 
for Labor and Employment Law, and chair of the 
editorial board of the Cayman Financial Review. 
Nathan A. Sales is an assistant professor of law 
at George Mason University School of Law where he 
teaches and writes on national security law, 
administrative law, and criminal law. 
David Schoenbrod is the Trustee Professor of 
Law at New York Law School in New York, New 
York and a visiting scholar at the American 
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.  He teaches 
and writes on legislation, administrative regulation, 
constitutional law, and environmental law. 
The views expressed herein are those of the 
amici and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
amici law professors’ employers or any other group 
or organization with which they may be affiliated. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court has never decided whether a federal 
agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction-
controlling statutory provisions should be eligible for 
deference under the two-step inquiry articulated in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but the foundation for the 
answer was made explicit in United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). There, the Court held 
that an agency’s interpretation of a statute is eligible 
for deference under Chevron only “when it appears 
that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules [about the meaning of that 
statute] carrying the force of law.”  Id. at 226-27. 
Mead teaches that there must be a clear sign of 
congressional intent to delegate authority to 
interpret a statutory provision before a court gives 
4 
  
“controlling weight” (that is, “Chevron deference”) to 
an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguities 
in that provision. Mead’s teaching comports with (1) 
Article I of the Constitution, which vests all 
legislative power in the Congress, (2) the rule that 
federal agencies have no inherent powers but only 
delegated ones, and (3) the principles directing that 
statutes should be construed to avoid difficult 
constitutional questions and in light of the modest 
constraints of the nondelegation doctrine. It also 
comports with the Administrative Procedure Act and 
decades of this Court’s precedents. And it limits the 
potential for aggrandizement by federal agencies, 
while ensuring that Congress is able to delegate 
authority to an agency to interpret statutory 
ambiguities when necessary and proper. 
Mead’s implications for the particular question 
presented in this case are clear.  A reviewing court 
should presume that an agency’s interpretation of 
ambiguity in jurisdiction-controlling provisions is not 
eligible for Chevron deference.  Questions of agency 
jurisdiction are questions of law that are for the 
courts to resolve in the first instance.  Further, a 
statutory ambiguity, standing alone, does not 
constitute a delegation of interpretive authority to a 
federal agency, let alone a delegation of authority to 
an agency to determine the scope of its own 
jurisdiction. 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in this case does not 
follow the proper analytical path. The Fifth Circuit 
neither looked for, nor found, a clear sign of 
congressional intent to delegate authority before 
deferring to the FCC’s interpretation of the alleged 
ambiguity in the provisions at issue here. Standing 
alone, that error should lead to vacatur of the Fifth 
5 
  
Circuit’s judgment and remand for further 
proceedings, consistent with Mead and the Court’s 
opinion.  
Affirming the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and 
reflexively treating the FCC’s interpretation of its 
own jurisdiction-controlling provisions as eligible for 
Chevron deference would be inconsistent with Mead 
and would establish a principle of statutory 
construction in direct opposition to the principles 
used by the Court in other cases interpreting 
statutes to avoid constitutional delegation problems.   
Treating the jurisdictional interpretations of 
federal agencies as eligible for Chevron deference 
also would create a particular risk of agency 
aggrandizement.  Just as one would not let foxes 
guard henhouses, courts should not presume 
Congress has authorized agencies to determine their 
own jurisdiction, for agencies will be prone to 
interpret ambiguities in line with agency interests.  
Extending eligibility for Chevron deference to 
interpretations of jurisdiction-controlling provisions 
also would give agencies a systematic advantage over 
Congress on questions of their own jurisdiction, and 
make it easier for Congress to shirk its responsibility 
to delegate power in a clear manner. None of those 
outcomes would be desirable or consistent with the 
careful allocation of power among the branches of 
government set forth in this Court’s precedents. 
The Court should adhere to Mead, vacate the 
Fifth Circuit’s judgment, and remand the case so 
that the Fifth Circuit can make an appropriate de 
novo assessment of the agency’s jurisdiction, without 





I. Chevron Applies Only When Congress 
Has Delegated Interpretive Authority 
To An Agency. 
The Court’s decision in Chevron set forth a 
familiar two-step inquiry for courts to apply when 
evaluating agency interpretations of federal statutes. 
In step one, the reviewing court considers the 
statutory text to determine “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If so, the statute controls, 
“for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 
Id. at 842-43. If the statute is “silent or ambiguous,” 
however, the court proceeds to step two and must 
defer to the agency’s statutory interpretation, so long 
as it “is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.” Id. at 843. In other words, at step two, the 
agency’s interpretation is given “controlling weight” 
unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844 (emphasis added). 
As the Court explained in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987), “the courts must respect 
the interpretation of the agency to which Congress 
has delegated the responsibility for administering 
the statutory program.” 
Chevron itself concerned a relatively routine, 
technical controversy concerning the implementation 
of a complex regulatory statute. Nothing in the 
Court’s decision purported to announce a landmark 
holding. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of 
Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in 
Administrative Law Stories 399, 402 (Peter L. 
Strauss ed., 2006). Perhaps because of the relatively 
routine and technical nature of the underlying 
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dispute in the Chevron case, the Court “was much 
clearer” in articulating Chevron’s two-step approach 
than it was in articulating “the rationale that 
accounted for it.” Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 197 (2006). Over the years,  
this lack of clarity has led to significant doctrinal 
confusion, tension, and debate in this Court and the 
circuit courts, as well as among academics and 
commentators, over Chevron’s “legal pedigree” and 
how broadly to apply the two-step Chevron deference 
analysis. See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. 
Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, 
Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 1497, 1522, 1525 (2009). 
Some commentators have argued that Chevron is 
grounded in constitutional separation-of-powers 
principles. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial 
Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 Admin. L.J. 269, 269-70 
(1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron 
and Stare Decisis, 85 Geo. L.J. 2225, 2232-34 (1997). 
Others have suggested that Chevron should be seen 
as a rule of federal common law. See, e.g., William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as 
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 
618-19 (1992); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous 
Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 
17 Yale J. on Reg. 327, 345-54 (2000). Still others 
maintain that Chevron deference is derived from 
congressional intent.  See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn & 
Pail Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 
20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989, 1007 (1999); Thomas W. 
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
Geo. L.J. 833, 836-37, 872 (2001); Sunstein, Chevron 
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Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. at 198; Daniel A. Lyons, 
Tethering the Administrative State: The Case Against 
Chevron Deference For FCC Jurisdictional Claims, 
36 J. Corp. L. 823, 830-31 (2011). 
Indeed, the conflict that presently exists among 
lower courts on the very question presented in this 
case reflects this fundamental doctrinal confusion, 
tension, and debate over Chevron’s rationale and 
scope.2  
While the Court may not have been as clear as it 
could have been about the doctrinal pedigree of its 
two-step approach in Chevron itself, the Court has 
been relatively consistent in maintaining that 
congressional delegation is the basis for according 
controlling weight to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. In Adams 
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990), the 
Court explained that “[a] precondition to deference 
                                            
2 Compare N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 
844, 847 (7th Cir. 2002); United Transp. Union-Illinois 
Legislative Bd. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 183 F.3d 606, 612 (7th 
Cir. 1999); Durable Mfg. Co. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 578 
F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2009); Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 
F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reviewing an agency’s 
determination of its own statutory jurisdiction without applying 
Chevron’s two-step analysis), with NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. 
CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 355 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 
856 F.2d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 1988); Lyon County Bd. of Comm’rs v. 
EPA, 406 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2005); Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 
608 F.3d 1131, 1145-1146 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying Chevron’s 




under Chevron is a congressional delegation of 
administrative authority.” Likewise in Dunn v. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 529 U.S. 465, 
479 n.14 (1997), the Court described Chevron 
deference as “aris[ing] out of background 
presumptions of congressional intent” (citing Smiley 
v. Citibank (S.D.), 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)). And 
in Christensen v. Harris County, 519 U.S. 576 (2000), 
a majority of the Court held that (i) Congress can 
only be said to have impliedly delegated the power to 
interpret ambiguous statutory language when it has 
granted an agency power to take actions that bind 
the public with the “force of law” and (ii) other 
agency interpretations should only receive a lesser 
form of deference (Skidmore deference) or no 
deference at all. Id. at 587 (citing Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).  
United States v. Mead Corp. made it even clearer 
that eligibility for Chevron deference depends on a 
delegation of interpretive authority to a federal 
agency. In Mead, the Court held that the U.S. 
Customs Service’s tariff classification rulings were 
not entitled to Chevron deference, and its decision 
makes it clear that “congressional intent is the 
touchstone” for determining whether an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute may be eligible for 
deference under Chevron’s two-step approach. Sales 
and Adler, The Rest Is Silence, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 
1526; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead 
Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and 
Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807, 812 (2002) 
(“At the most general level, Mead eliminates any 
doubt that Chevron deference is grounded in 
congressional intent.”). As the Court put it then, 
Chevron applies “when it appears that Congress 
10 
  
delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated 
in the exercise of that authority.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 
226-27. The Court further explained that while there 
are many ways Congress may demonstrate its 
intention to delegate interpretive authority 
(including, as in Mead itself, by granting authority to 
engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking), an 
agency’s decision is not eligible for Chevron deference 
without that demonstration of Congress’s intent. Id. 
at 227. 
Mead’s explicit grounding of Chevron deference 
in Congress’s intent to delegate authority to 
interpret ambiguity in a statute has several 
important implications for the doctrinal debates 
about Chevron’s legal pedigree and how broadly to 
apply the Chevron deference analysis.  
First, by making it clear that eligibility for 
Chevron deference depends on Congress’s intent, 
Mead also makes it clear that Chevron deference 
does not arise directly from constitutional 
separation-of-powers principles. Judicial deference 
under Chevron is possible and appropriate only 
where there is reason to think that Congress has 
delegated authority to the agency to fill in gaps and 
resolve ambiguities in a particular statute, and it 
always is subject to congressional control and 
revision. In other words, “Chevron deference should 
apply only where Congress would want [it] to apply.” 
See Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, at 836-
37.  Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of 
Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 
2130 (2002) (“Congress could by statute eliminate 
the Chevron doctrine.”). 
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Second, Mead makes it clear that there must be 
a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to 
delegate authority to an agency to interpret a 
statutory ambiguity before a court extends Chevron 
deference to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of 
that ambiguity. Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. at 836-37; Sunstein, Chevron 
Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. at 208. If there is a clear 
sign of Congress’s intent to delegate interpretive 
authority, the interpretation is eligible for deference 
under Chevron’s two-step inquiry. If not, the agency’s 
interpretation is not eligible for Chevron deference, 
and the court should apply a lesser form of deference 
or no deference at all. Sales and Adler, The Rest Is 
Silence, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 1526. 
Third, Mead confirms that mere ambiguity in a 
statute is not sufficient to establish that Congress 
intended to delegate to an agency interpretive 
authority over that ambiguity. See also Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (“Chevron 
deference, however, is not accorded merely because 
the statute is ambiguous and an administrative 
official is involved.”).  As lower courts have 
recognized, ambiguity is necessary, but not 
sufficient, to establish a delegation of authority and 
allow for Chevron deference.  See Michigan v. EPA, 
268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Mere 
ambiguity in a statute is not evidence of 
congressional delegation of authority”); Atlantic City 
v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); 
American Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (same); Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 
491, 502 (5th Cir. 2007).     
After Mead, courts must look for a clear sign that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency to resolve 
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an ambiguity in a statute, relying on the traditional 
tools of statutory interpretation. A clear sign can be 
manifest in the text of the statute, in the agency’s 
power to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
or in other ways. However, there must be an 
affirmative reason to conclude that Congress 
intended the agency to have interpretive authority 
and courts to give controlling weight to the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation. As Professor Adrian 
Vermeule, a Mead critic, has written: 
Rather than taking ambiguity to signify 
delegation, Mead establishes that the default 
rule runs against delegation. Unless the 
reviewing court affirmatively finds that 
Congress intended to delegate interpretive 
authority to the particular agency at hand, in 
the particular statutory scheme at hand, 
Chevron deference is not due and the Chevron 
two-step is not to be invoked. 
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the 
Trenches, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347, 348 (2003), 
quoted in Sales and Adler, The Rest Is Silence, 2009 
U. Ill. L. Rev. at 1528. 
Fourth, Mead’s focus on congressional intent also 
suggests that certain types of statutes are less likely 
to be subject to the Chevron framework. Cf. Food & 
Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (“In extraordinary cases, … 
there may be reason to hesitate before concluding 
that Congress has intended such an implicit 
delegation.”). 
For example, the Court frequently has suggested 
that Congress would expect a reviewing court to give 
controlling weight to an agency’s reasonable 
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interpretation of an ambiguity in a statute where (1) 
the agency has specialized knowledge or expertise in 
the technical subject matter of a statute—knowledge 
and expertise that gives the agency an institutional 
advantage over a reviewing court in resolving 
statutory questions in accord with Congress’s policy 
objectives and intent, (2) deference to the agency 
would increase political control and accountability, or 
(3) the agency’s range of reasonable interpretive 
choices are tethered to express statutory mandates 
that serve to limit the danger of agency self-dealing 
and aggrandizement.3 Conversely, the Court has 
been reluctant to give controlling weight to an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguity in a statute 
where the agency lacks expertise or competence 
relative to a court or where deference arguably would 
decrease political accountability and increase the 
dangers of agency self-dealing and aggrandizement.4 
                                            
3 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (regulations eligible for 
deference where agency indisputably had authority to interpret 
statutory ambiguities and was an “expert[] in the field,” and 
part of a “political branch of Government.”); see also City of New 
York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 67 (1988) (regulations deemed 
eligible for deference where the statute “grants the [FCC] the 
power to ‘establish technical standards’” (citation omitted)); 
NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) 
(Board’s order “on an issue that implicates its expertise in labor 
relations” was eligible for deference where the Court previously 
determined “that the task of defining the scope” of the statute 
was for agency); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 381-82 (1969) (upholding regulations where Congress 
“ratified” agency construction “with positive legislation”). 
4 See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 243 (evaluating an executive 
officer’s claim of delegated interpretive authority de novo; and 
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II. Courts Should Presume Chevron Does Not 
Apply To An Agency’s Interpretation Of Its 
Own Jurisdiction-Controlling Statutory 
Provisions. 
A federal agency’s interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction-controlling statutory provisions should 
not be eligible for Chevron deference unless the 
reviewing court (1) conducts a de novo review of the 
statutory scheme and (2) finds an affirmative reason 
to conclude that Congress intended the agency to 
have authority to make interpretations of the 
jurisdiction-controlling provisions that carry the 
force of law. 
A. The Court Has Never Held That An 
Agency’s Interpretation Of Jurisdiction-
Controlling Provisions Is Eligible For 
Chevron Deference. 
Whenever an issue has arisen regarding an  
agency’s authority to issue a binding interpretation 
of a jurisdiction-controlling provisions, the Court has 
reviewed the agency’s authority de novo—assessing 
whether Congress has delegated power to make rules 
with the force of law.  The Court never has held an 
agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction-
controlling provisions to be eligible for Chevron 
deference.  There is no reason to reverse course.   
                                                                                         
rejecting the claimed authority where, among other things, the 
claimed authority (1) did not comport with the text of the 
statutory delegation provision; (2) would have an 
“extraordinary” effect on the balance of power among branches 
of the federal government and between the federal government 
and the states; and (3) did not align with any special “expertise” 
of the officer. 
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Two years after Chevron, in Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), the 
Court made remarks that implied that an agency’s 
views on the scope of its jurisdiction could be eligible 
for deference from the judiciary under Chevron. 
However, a close reading of Schor shows that the 
Court reviewed and decided the jurisdiction of the 
CFTC de novo, based on the “face of the [Commodity 
Exchange Act],” its “unambiguous[]” legislative 
history, and “abundant evidence” of what Congress 
“plainly intended.” Id. at 841-43, 847. It was only 
after the Court had conducted its own independent 
assessment of the jurisdiction-controlling statutory 
provisions that the Court made passing remarks 
about the CFTC’s “long-held position” on the 
meaning of the provisions. Id. at 845 (describing the 
CFTC position as reasonable and worthy of 
considerable weight under Chevron). And, even those 
passing remarks were prefaced by what appears to 
be an independent judicial determination that the 
CFTC had some sort of (unspecified) “delegated 
authority” under the Act to make rules interpreting 
the jurisdiction-controlling provisions. Id. In any 
event, in light of the Court’s preceding independent 
assessment of the CFTC’s jurisdiction under the Act, 
the Court’s passing remarks about the CFTC’s 
position on the jurisdictional issue should be seen for 
what they are—dicta from the beginning of the 
Chevron era.  
Two years after Schor, in Mississippi Power & 
Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 
(1988), Justices Scalia and Brennan wrote dueling 
opinions that did address the question of whether a 
federal agency’s interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction-controlling provisions should be eligible 
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for Chevron deference. Id. at 377-84 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment), 384-91 (Brennan, J. 
dissenting). Although the competing considerations 
of the two justices have been echoed repeatedly by 
jurists and academics, they were not addressed in 
the Court’s primary opinion. Id. at 367-70 (Stevens, 
J., for the Court) (making no reference to Chevron). 
Furthermore, since Mississippi Power, the Court has 
sidestepped numerous opportunities to illuminate 
the extent to which jurisdictional questions ought to 
be analyzed under the Chevron framework, typically 
by finding the meaning of jurisdiction-controlling 
statutory provisions to be plain and unambiguous.5  
                                            
5 See Mississippi Power, 487 U.S. at 370-77 (Stevens, J., for the 
Court) (upholding the agency’s jurisdiction without citing 
Chevron); Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 
42-43 (1990) (holding that Congress clearly denied the OMB 
jurisdiction to review disclosure rules under the Paperwork 
Reductions Act); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 
(1994) (striking down FCC’s regulation that would eliminate 
tariff filings for most interexchange telephones); Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (holding that Congress clearly 
denied the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco); Nat’l Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967 (2005) (sidestepping FCC jurisdiction issues); 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that the 
Clean Air Act unambiguously conferred jurisdiction on the EPA 
to regulate greenhouse gases). 
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B. An Agency’s Interpretation Of 
Jurisdiction-Controlling Provisions 
Should Not Be Eligible For Chevron 
Deference Unless A Court Finds A 
Clear Sign Congress Vested The 
Agency With Authority To Interpret 
Ambiguities In Those Provisions. 
The delegation principle implicit in Chevron and 
explicit in Adams Fruit, Dunn, Christensen, and 
Mead provides a solid foundation for the right 
answer to the question presented in this case. Simply 
put, an agency’s interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction-controlling provisions should not be 
eligible for Chevron deference, unless a court finds a 
clear sign of congressional intent to delegate 
authority to the agency to determine, in a reasonable 
way, the meaning of ambiguity in the jurisdiction-
controlling provisions. Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. at 836-37; Sales and Adler, The 
Rest Is Silence, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 1528-32; 
Lyons, Tethering the Administrative State, 36 J. 
Corp. L. at 831-32. 
Furthermore, the clear sign that a court needs 
cannot be established by mere ambiguity in the 
jurisdiction-controlling provisions themselves. There 
must be an affirmative reason for the reviewing court 
to conclude that Congress intended or expected the 
agency to have interpretive authority. Merrill & 
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. at 836-37; 
Sales and Adler, The Rest Is Silence, 2009 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. at 1528-32; Lyons, Tethering the Administrative 
State, 36 J. Corp. L. at 831-32.  That a statute fails to 
resolve a jurisdictional question is not, in itself, 
evidence of Congressional intent to delegate 
authority to an agency.   
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There should be, in other words, a strong 
presumption against treating an agency’s 
interpretation of jurisdiction-controlling statutes as 
eligible for Chevron deference—a presumption that 
can be rebutted only by a de novo statutory analysis 
that shows that Congress affirmatively entrusted the 
agency with such authority. See Nathan S. Chapman 
& Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation 
of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1788 (2012) (“Rather 
than defer to executive assertions of power, courts 
should presume that Congress has not intended to 
delegate power unless it has done so with clarity.”). 
C. A Strong Presumption Against 
Chevron Deference In Cases Of 
Jurisdiction-Controlling Provisions 
Comports With Constitutional 
Principles Requiring That A 
Delegation To An Agency Be Guided 
By An Intelligible Principle. 
A strong presumption against extending Chevron 
deference in cases involving agency interpretations 
of jurisdiction-controlling provisions would be 
consistent with (1) Article I of the Constitution, 
which vests all legislative power in the Congress; (2) 
settled principles of constitutional law that make it 
clear that federal agencies have no inherent powers 
but only delegated ones; and (3) the rules providing 
that statutes should be construed to avoid difficult 
constitutional questions and in light of the modest 
constraints of the nondelegation doctrine. U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 1; Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 
281, 302 (1979) (“The legislative power of the United 
States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of 
quasi-legislative authority by governmental 
departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant 
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of such power by the Congress and subject to 
limitations that body imposes.”). 
It is “axiomatic” that a federal agency has no 
inherent power to act unless and until Congress 
delegates power to it through a statute. Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988); 
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 
(1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act... 
unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). 
Furthermore, consistent with Article I, Congress 
cannot give an agency the power to define its own 
political or public policy mission; Congress must 
define the agency’s power and authority and give the 
agency an “intelligible principle” to guide the 
agency’s efforts to interpret, implement, and enforce 
the statute.  
The nondelegation doctrine ensures that 
“important choices of social policy are made by 
Congress, the branch of our Government most 
responsible to the popular will.” Industrial Union 
Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 
U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The 
doctrine prevents Congress from forsaking its duties 
and prevents agencies from arrogating undelegated 
powers. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 
(1996). Simply put, the doctrine fosters democratic 
accountability and safeguards liberty. 
While this Court has been reluctant to apply the 
nondelegation doctrine directly to strike down 
statutes that delegate power to agencies, see 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989), 
it consistently has reaffirmed the bedrock 
constitutional principle that agencies have only those 
powers delegated to them by Congress. The Court 
thus has interpreted statutes so as to avoid potential 
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nondelegation doctrine problems, see, e.g., Industrial 
Union Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 646; Nat’l Cable Television 
Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974), 
and has required an agency to construe a statute so 
as to avoid nondelegation doctrine concerns. See 
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Public Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 
366, 388-89 (1999).6 This approach ensures that 
federal agencies only exercise those powers actually 
delegated by Congress.  See Chapman & McConnell, 
Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. at 
1786-87 (“Armed with the understanding that the 
legislative branch, not the executive, makes law, 
courts should interpret statutes narrowly to ensure 
that any delegation is the genuine intention of 
Congress, and not an instance of executive 
overreach.”). 
The question of whether Congress has delegated 
authority to an agency to decide the meaning of 
jurisdiction-controlling statutory provisions logically 
and chronologically precedes the question of whether 
the agency’s exercise of that power is entitled to 
deference under Chevron. See NLRB v. Food and 
Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(Chevron review of agency interpretations of statutes 
applies only to regulations “promulgated pursuant to 
congressional authority”); Crandon v. United States, 
494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment) (rejecting Chevron deference where the 
statute “is not administered by any agency but by 
the courts”); cf. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
                                            
6 See also John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 315-17 (2000). 
21 
  
Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (refusing to 
sanction “‘unauthorized assumption by an agency of 
major policy decisions’” (quoting American Ship 
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)).   
A holding in this case that recognizes this reality 
and establishes a strong presumption against 
extending Chevron deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of jurisdiction-controlling provisions 
would advance the ultimate concerns of the 
nondelegation doctrine and avoid potential 
constitutional problems associated with giving 
agencies interpretive authority to define their own 
jurisdiction by presumption or implication. 
D. A Strong Presumption Against 
Chevron Deference Also Comports 
With The Administrative Procedure 
Act And Decades Of Precedents. 
The text of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and decades of administrative law precedents 
from this Court further reinforce the conclusion that 
an agency’s interpretation of jurisdiction-controlling 
statutory provisions should not be eligible for 
Chevron deference unless a court finds a delegation 
by Congress to the agency of authority to issue 
reasonable interpretations of ambiguities in the 
jurisdiction-controlling provisions. 
In the APA, Congress directed that the courts 
should decide “all relevant questions of law.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706.  As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent 
in Mead, “[t]here is some question whether Chevron 
was faithful to the text of the [APA], which it did not 
even bother to cite.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).  Yet, there is no genuine conflict 
between § 706 and Chevron in this case or any other, 
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so long as a reviewing court conducts a de novo 
review of the particular statutory scheme and 
decides for itself (without deference to the agency) 
whether Congress has entrusted the agency with 
authority to issue reasonable interpretations of a 
particular statutory provision that carry the force of 
law.  If the court answers that “relevant” question of 
law in the affirmative, then the court’s legal finding 
(that Congress shifted primary responsibility for 
interpreting statutory ambiguities from the court to 
the agency) makes it possible to proceed with the 
Chevron inquiry in harmony with § 706.  If the court 
answers that “relevant” question of law in the 
negative, deference under Chevron is not possible. 
The APA further recognizes a distinction 
between (1) questions of agency jurisdiction and (2) 
other questions of law or policy that are relevant to 
evaluating agency rulemakings and actions. As the 
APA makes clear, agencies only have authority to 
interpret, implement, and enforce a law or regulation 
when the agency has jurisdiction. Section 558(b), for 
instance, provides that “[a] sanction may not be 
imposed or a substantive rule or order issued except 
within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as 
authorized by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 558(b). Likewise 
§ 706(2)(C) provides that courts are to invalidate and 
set aside those agency actions determined to be “in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. 
§706(2)(C).   
Decades of this Court’s precedents reinforce the 
legal distinction between questions of agency 
jurisdiction and other questions of law or policy. 
These precedents also support a holding by the Court 
in this case that an agency’s interpretation of 
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jurisdiction-controlling provisions ordinarily should 
not be eligible for Chevron deference. See Federal 
Maritime Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 
726, 745 (1973) (“an agency may not bootstrap itself 
into an area in which it has no jurisdiction” through 
the adoption of a long-standing interpretation of its 
statutory authority); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United 
States, 434 U.S. 275, 288 n.5 (1978) (rejecting an 
administrator’s “unexplained exercise of supposed 
authority”); Adams Fruit Co., 494 U.S. at 650 (citing 
and quoting Seatrain and Adamo Wrecking as 
establishing “fundamental” principles of 
administrative law).  
The reasoning in these cases aligns fully with 
Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. The agency cannot 
bootstrap itself into an area where it has no 
jurisdiction through an interpretation of jurisdiction-
controlling provisions.  To the contrary, an agency’s 
interpretation of those provisions may be eligible for 
Chevron deference only “when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally 
to make rules [about the meaning of that statute] 
carrying the force of law.” Id.  Furthermore, as the 
text of the APA and the case law described above 
demonstrate, a reviewing court cannot wash its 
hands of responsibility for assessing whether 
Congress has made such a delegation to an agency. 
Some have objected that “there is no discernible 
line” between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
questions.  Mississippi Power, 487 U.S. at 381  
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Such 
concerns are overstated.  “However fuzzy or difficult 
to apply the concept of jurisdiction may be in some 
instances, both Congress and the Court consistently 
have drawn a distinction between questions of 
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agency jurisdiction and other legal questions and 
limitations on agency power.” Sales and Adler, The 
Rest Is Silence, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 1537. This 
Court and lower federal courts routinely distinguish 
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional 
questions, and this inquiry presents no greater 
challenge than those addressed by federal courts all 
the time.  Id. at 1557-60; Lars Noah, Interpreting 
Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in 
Administrative Law, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1463, 
1522-24 (2000).   
Requiring agencies to identify a statutory basis 
for any jurisdictional claim will resolve many cases.  
Courts may also consider whether a given assertion 
of jurisdiction is novel for an agency or strays from 
its “core regulatory assignment.”  Gellhorn & 
Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-based Delegations, 20 
Cardozo L. Rev. at 1009, 1011; see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 
96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1130 (2008) (distinguishing 
between “wholesale” and “retail” applications of a 
statute). In all instances, however, the existence of 
agency jurisdiction is a necessary predicate for 
Chevron deference.  This distinction between 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions should 




E. A Strong Presumption Against 
Chevron Deference Would Limit 
Agency Aggrandizement, While 
Ensuring That Congress Can Enact 
A Statute Making The Agency The 
Primary Interpreter Of Its Own 
Jurisdiction, If And When Congress 
Wishes To Do So. 
As the Court recognized in Brown & Williamson, 
529 U.S. at 159, in “extraordinary” cases, there is 
“reason to hesitate” before concluding that Congress 
intended to entrust an agency with primary 
responsibility for interpreting ambiguities in federal 
statutes or expected a court to give controlling 
weight to an agency’s views.  
By any fair measure, an agency’s interpretation 
of jurisdiction-controlling provisions presents an 
“extraordinary” case, requiring a careful analysis of 
the natural and legitimate expectations of Congress 
both in general and in a particular case.  This is so 
because an agency’s interpretation of jurisdiction-
controlling provisions poses a special risk of agency 
self-dealing or aggrandizement: a risk that the 
agency will exercise a power Congress did not intend 
or expect it to have or that it will extend its power 
more broadly than Congress envisioned.  
Extending Chevron deference to agency to 
interpretations of jurisdiction-controlling provisions 
contravenes a fundamental principle within the 
Anglo-American legal tradition.  See, e.g., 1 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries 91 (“if an act of 
parliament gives a man power to try all causes, that 
arise within his manor of Dale; yet if a cause should 
arise in which he himself is party, the act is 
construed not to extend to that; because it is 
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unreasonable that any man should determine his 
own quarrel.”); The Federalist No. 10 (James 
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (“No man is allowed 
to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest 
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not 
improbably, corrupt his integrity.”); The Federalist 
No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) 
(“No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own 
cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the 
least interest or bias.”).  The Framers of the 
Constitution were acutely aware of the tendency of 
individuals to favor their own interest.  Indeed, this 
was among the central problems the Constitution’s 
structure of separated powers is designed to solve. 
See The Federalist, No. 51 (James Madison) (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961).     
This principle, that “foxes should not guard 
henhouses,” is among those upon which judicial 
review of agency action is based. See Ernest A. 
Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
869, 889 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting 
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 
405, 446 (1989) (“The basic case for judicial review 
depends upon the proposition that foxes should not 
guard henhouses.”).  Agency officials are no less 
prone to the temptation to interpret ambiguities in 
light of their own self-interest, however measured. 
See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and 
Agency Self-Interest, 13 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 
203, 208-11 (2004) (discussing agency self-interest).  
Judicial review of agency action helps ensure that 
agencies do not engage in self-dealing or 
aggrandizement.   
Even before Chevron, courts were wary of 
allowing agencies to determine the scope of their own 
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power.  For example, in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit 
Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944), the Court held 
that the “[d]etermination of the extent of authority 
given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left 
for the decision of him in whom authority is vested.” 
Likewise, in Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 
U.S. 358, 369 (1946), the Court made it clear that 
“[an] agency may not finally decide the limits of its 
statutory power[;] [t]hat is a judicial function.” The 
Court did not abandon such concerns with Chevron.  
To the contrary, as Professors Gellhorn and Verkuil 
observed, the very structure of Chevron is attentive 
to the problem of agency aggrandizement in that “it 
requires courts to make the first determination of 
whether Congress answered the precise question at 
issue [because] agencies have no comparative 
advantage in reading statutes and . . . agency self-
interest may cloud [an agencys] judgment.”  
Controlling Chevron-based Delegations, 20 Cardozo 
L. Rev. at 1009. 
Aggrandizement not only raises the risk that an 
agency might wield excessive power but also that it 
might disrupt Congress’s intended distribution of 
power. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation 
Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
223, 276-77 (“If Congress has addressed a subject, 
but has done so in a limited way, this fact may itself 
suggest that Congress has gone as far as it could, as 
far as the enacting coalition wished to, on the subject 
in question”); see also Sales and Adler, The Rest Is 
Silence, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 1551-53; Merrill & 
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. at 912 
(noting that no matter what Congress might 
naturally intend or expect in a case involving an 
ordinary statutory provision, it does “not follow” that 
28 
  
Congress would naturally harbor the same intent or 
expectation in a case that implicates the existence or 
scope of an agency’s jurisdiction).7   
A comparison of the institutional competencies 
and incentives of Congress, the courts, and agencies 
reinforces the conclusion that an agency’s 
interpretation of a jurisdiction-controlling provision 
ordinarily should not be eligible for judicial deference 
under Chevron’s two-step inquiry.  
Even if one believes that an agency may have 
some unique or valuable insight into the construction 
of jurisdiction-controlling provisions based on the 
                                            
7 In a smaller but no less important set of cases, an agency may 
interpret a statute to disclaim jurisdiction—that is, the agency 
may affirmatively renounce a power arguably granted to it or 
conclude that an undisputedly granted power does not extend 
as far as it might. Jurisdiction-disclaiming interpretations pose 
the risk of abrogation: the possibility that an agency might fail 
to discharge the duty with which Congress has charged it, 
perhaps because of policy disagreements with the legislature or 
because it fears public disapproval for taking politically 
unpopular actions. Power-disclaiming interpretations also can 
pose a danger of a different sort of agency aggrandizement: 
agencies might focus on matters that advance their own 
institutional interests, as distinct from the interests Congress 
tasked them with serving. See Sales and Adler, The Rest Is 
Silence, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 1503-07, 1548-50. Given the 
potential for self-interested agency action that might disrupt 
Congress’s intended distribution of power, we see no doctrinal 
or practical reason to distinguish between jurisdiction-seizing 
and jurisdiction-denying agency interpretations. Id.  And the 
Court has not drawn any such distinction either.  See, e.g., 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497.  
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agency’s expertise in a particular subject or its 
familiarity with a federal statutory scheme or 
program, Mississippi Power, 487 U.S. at 381-82 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), it seems only 
fair to say that an agency will have much less 
institutional competence in answering questions of 
jurisdiction than in answering complex technical or 
scientific questions or making policy judgments 
about how best to implement a statutory regime.  At 
the same time, the risks of aggrandizement or 
abrogation associated with an agency’s 
interpretation of its own jurisdiction-controlling 
provisions are much greater than in any ordinary 
case involving complex technical or scientific 
questions or competing policy judgments about how 
best to implement a statutory regime. Agencies are, 
after all, “proactive” “‘policy entrepreneurs.’”  Sales 
and Adler, The Rest Is Silence, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 
1553-54 (citation omitted); Lyons, Tethering the 
Administrative State, 36 J. Corp. L. at 836-37.  
In contrast, federal courts have their own unique 
and valuable insights into the construction of 
jurisdiction-controlling provisions based on the 
courts’ historical position and experience as the 
arbiters of power among the various branches of 
government. Furthermore, courts are inherently 
reactive institutions: they cannot issue advisory 
opinions or initiate proceedings to affirm or deny 
agency jurisdiction over an activity or field.  Sales 
and Adler, The Rest Is Silence, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 
1553-54 (citation omitted); Lyons, Tethering the 
Administrative State, 36 J. Corp. L. at 836-37.  
On balance, “it seems highly unlikely that a 
responsible Congress would implicitly delegate to an 
agency the power to define the scope of its own 
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power.” ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1567 n.32 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). Indeed, it is unlikely Congress 
would delegate such authority at all.  As then-Judge 
Breyer observed, “Congress is more likely to have 
focused upon, and answered, major questions,” such 
as whether to confer jurisdiction to an agency, while 
“leaving interstitial matters,” such as how delegated 
authority is exercised, for resolution by the agency 
during the “daily administration” of the statute.  
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law 
and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986).  
III. The Fifth Circuit Did Not Follow The 
Proper Path When It Automatically 
Treated The FCC’s Interpretation Of 
Jurisdiction-Controlling Statutory 
Provisions As Eligible For Chevron 
Deference. 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in this case does not 
follow the proper analytical path. That court neither 
sought nor found a clear sign of congressional intent 
to delegate authority to the FCC to interpret 
ambiguity in the agency’s jurisdiction-controlling 
provisions before deeming the FCC’s interpretation of 
those provisions eligible for Chevron deference. 
Standing alone, that error should lead to vacatur of 
the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remand for further 
proceedings, consistent with Mead and the Court’s 
opinion. 
Affirming the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and 
treating the federal agency’s interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction-controlling provisions as eligible for 
Chevron deference, without requiring an 
independent search by a court for a clear sign of 
Congress’s intent to vest the agency with the power 
to make a reasonable ruling on that issue, would be a 
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mistake. It would be inconsistent with Mead and 
would establish a principle of statutory construction 
that is in direct opposition to the principles used by 
the Court in other cases interpreting statutes to 
avoid constitutional nondelegation problems. It 
would create a serious risk of self-dealing and 
aggrandizement by federal agencies, especially by 
independent federal agencies that are even further 
removed from political control and accountability 
than agencies under presidential administration. It 
would give agencies a systematic advantage over 
Congress on jurisdictional questions.  And it would 
make it easier for Congress to shirk its 
responsibilities to delegate power clearly. None of 
those outcomes would be desirable or consistent with 
the balance of power among Congress, courts, and 
agencies struck in past cases. 
The Court should adhere to Mead, vacate the 
Fifth Circuit’s judgment, and remand the case so 
that the Fifth Circuit can make an appropriate 
assessment of whether Congress intended to entrust 
the FCC with the power to interpret the jurisdiction-
controlling provisions at issue and, if Congress did 
not, to make its own determination of the agency’s 
jurisdiction, without Chevron deference to the 
agency’s views on those threshold jurisdictional 




For these reasons, and those set forth by the 
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